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0. Introduction 
 
The problem of skepticism, it hardly needs to be said, is widely regarded as one of the deepest and 
most important problems in philosophy. Skepticism is often personified in the shadowy figure of “the 
skeptic,” who denies, of some large swathe of what we take to be our ordinary knowledge, that we 
know it after all. The philosophical challenge – as it’s sometimes framed, though this way of setting 
the problem up has its critics – is to say whether there’s anything we can say to the skeptic that 
rationally ought to change her mind. 
Outside the philosophy classroom, global skeptics – skeptics about all purported knowledge, 
or at least all purported empirical knowledge about the external world – are rare. But there are people 
who describe themselves as “skeptics” about various more specific domains. Among these are self-
professed “climate change skeptics” – skeptics about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. 
 There is little philosophical literature that juxtaposes the climate change skeptic with the 
external world skeptic, or that explores the parallels between the problems that these two figures pose.1 
Of the philosophical literature that there is on climate change skepticism specifically, most of it focuses 
on the quasi-sociological project of explaining why climate change skepticism abounds, despite the 
strong expert consensus that anthropogenic climate change is real.2  
Part of the explanation of this is that, while both the external world skeptic and the climate 
change skeptic are typically cast as nefarious figures, many “traditional” epistemologists likely take it 
for granted that the former poses a serious philosophical challenge in a way that the latter doesn’t. 
Addressing the external world skeptic is taken to be a highly ambitious philosophical project, one that 
has stalked millennia of philosophical tradition. The climate change skeptic, by contrast, seems to just 
be obviously and demonstrably failing to respond correctly to her evidence.3 Put in a  picturesque way, 
the thought is that philosophical analysis of the climate change skeptic must operate in the space of 
causes rather than the space of reasons – for the reasons are clearly settled. 
 At the same time, many of those who are interested in applied epistemology and climate 
change may think that there is not much to be learned from debates about the external world skeptic. 
They may find the external skeptic’s challenge to all our knowledge to be distant from both common 
sense and real-world concerns,4 and the attention to it symptomatic of what’s wrong with “traditional” 
or “individual” epistemology. And they may not see much of a parallel between the climate change 
skeptic’s arguments and those of the external world skeptic. 
 Here, I’ll try to show that both of these views are mistaken. I think that the external world 
skeptic raises deep questions that are important for our everyday deliberation about what to believe. 
And I also think that there are significant parallels between the arguments for external world 
skepticism and those for at least a form of climate change skepticism that is idealized – but not too 
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idealized! – from the views of real-world, flesh-and-blood climate change skeptics. As such, the 
idealized climate change skeptic poses a challenge quite analogous to that of the external world skeptic.  
In drawing this parallel, I do not intend to honor the climate change skeptic. I agree with the 
mainstream consensus that the climate change skeptic is irrational. That said, as I’ll try to show, some 
of the same difficulties with creating a persuasive reply to the external world skeptic carry over to the 
case of the climate change skeptic.  
1. The external world skeptic 
 
Obviously, it’s beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive survey of different 
arguments for external world skepticism. I’ll make do with a brief review of one common, famous 
skeptical strategy. 
 This strategy begins by describing some skeptical scenario. A skeptical scenario is a situation in 
which one is radically deceived about how the external world is: where there is a giant difference 
between appearances and reality. One of the most famous skeptical scenarios is the brain-in-a-vat 
scenario. In this scenario, you have no human body as we would ordinarily think of it; you are just a 
brain in a vat of jelly. Scientists have hooked wires up to the brain, and stimulate it to make things 
appear a certain way. But none of the appearances match reality. So, when it seems to you as if you 
are seated in a room, reading a philosophy book, really the scientists are just making things appear that 
way: in fact, you are just a brain-in-a-vat being made to think that you are seated in a room, reading a 
philosophy book. And similarly for all your other empirical beliefs about how the external world is. 
 The skeptic does not, of course, affirmatively claim that you are a brain-in-a-vat, or the victim 
of a skeptical scenario more generally. Rather, the skeptic’s claim is that you don’t know that you aren’t 
a brain-in-a-vat. This claim, together with an application of the “closure” principle for knowledge, 
forms the basis for what Keith DeRose (1995) calls the Argument from Ignorance: 
  
(1) You don’t know that you’re not a brain-in-a-vat. 
(2) If you don’t know that you’re not a brain-in-a-vat, then you don’t know that you’re seated in 
a room, reading a philosophy book. 
Therefore, 
(C) You don’t know that you’re seated in a room, reading a philosophy book. 
 
If successful, the argument generalizes to show that you don’t know any ordinary proposition about 
how the external world is – provided it is something the scientists could be deceiving you about, just 
substitute the relevant proposition into the consequent of premise (2), and the conclusion. 
 Some have said that the Argument from Ignorance is not a particularly compelling skeptical 
argument as it stands, because its first premise can’t just be taken for granted.5 But there are ancillary 
arguments to be made for the first premise. Here is one. You could only know that you’re not a brain-
in-a-vat by possessing some evidence that you’re not a brain-in-a-vat. But it’s unclear what this 
evidence could be. You might try saying that it doesn’t look like you’re a brain-in-a-vat. But it’s built 
into the brain-in-a-vat scenario that if you were in this scenario, it wouldn’t look to you like you are, 
since it’s part of the scenario that the scientists are making it appear that you have an ordinary human 
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body. Since it would appear that you’re not a brain-in-a-vat whether you were a brain-in-a-vat or not, 
this appearance isn’t evidence that you aren’t a brain-in-a-vat. The brain-in-a-vat scenario is capable 
of explaining away any apparent evidence against itself, so that nothing can count as evidence against 
it. (Indeed, this is what makes it such an effective skeptical scenario.6) Thus, the skeptic claims, you 
cannot know that it doesn’t obtain. 
 Additionally, some have thought that the Argument from Ignorance should not worry us 
because it only targets our knowledge of ordinary propositions, and not the claim that we justifiably believe 
such propositions.7 Perhaps we shouldn’t be too worried about whether we have knowledge; (highly) 
justified belief may be all we need. However, the ancillary argument for the first premise of the 
argument points the way to an answer to this objection too. For, if that ancillary argument is right, 
then we have no evidence that we are not brains in vats – nothing that favors the hypothesis that we 
aren’t brains-in-vats over the hypothesis that we are. If this is so, it seems we’re not even justified in 
believing that we’re not brains-in-vats. And then – assuming a closure principle for justification – it 
seems that we’re not justified in holding ordinary beliefs, like your belief that you’re seated in a room, 
reading a philosophy book. 
2. The idealized climate change skeptic 
 
Different people who call themselves “climate change skeptics” hold different views, and some of 
these views are more analogous to the external world skeptic than others. To make the climate change 
skeptic somewhat analogous to the external world skeptic, we’ll have to stipulate a number of things 
about him. This is, of course, to idealize somewhat from the messy and indeterminate states of mind 
that many real world “climate change skeptics” have. So let me sketch an “idealized” climate change 
skeptic. By calling this skeptic “idealized”, I don’t mean to say that he meets some important normative 
ideal, but simply that he has been imagined so as to be as analogous to the external world skeptic as 
possible. 
First, and most importantly, the idealized climate change skeptic will genuinely be a climate 
change skeptic. Some self-described climate change “skeptics” positively affirm that anthropogenic 
climate change is not occurring – that it is a “hoax”. Such people aren’t really skeptics in the sense 
that is operative in epistemology. A skeptic about some domain is someone who affirms that 
knowledge about that domain is not possible. Thus, a climate change skeptic is someone who affirms 
that we cannot know whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring. By contrast, someone who 
positively asserts that anthropogenic climate change is not occurring is better called a climate change 
denier. The analogue of the climate change denier is not the external world skeptic, but the idealist, 
who affirms that there is no (material) external world.  
It’s very hard to see what could possibly justify an ordinary person in engaging in outright 
climate change denial. Since an ordinary person lacks the competence to responsibly evaluate the first-
order scientific evidence about climate change for himself, it does not seem that he could be justified 
on the basis of a direct examination of that evidence. Nor does it seem that he could be justified on 
the basis of the testimony from the very small percentage of experts who deny the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change – at least not if he is aware of the many experts who hold the opposite 
view. One can’t (justifiably) just arbitrarily pick and choose the experts one heeds in this way.8 If denial 
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can’t be justified either on the basis of direct examination of the first-order evidence, or on the basis 
of testimony, then plausibly, it cannot be justified at all. 
But although no doubt many professed climate change “skeptics” are in fact deniers rather 
than skeptics, this is not true of all such people. In their book Merchants of Doubt, which details the 
attempts of corporately-funded renegade scientists to sow confusion about the reality of (among other 
things) anthropogenic climate change, Naomi Oreskes & Erik Conway stress that the narratives 
advanced in this cause are often ones of doubt, uncertainty, and a multiplicity of competing 
explanations of the data, rather than of certainty that anthropogenic climate change is not occurring.9 
The aim, essentially, is to get people to be skeptics about climate change. 
A second feature of the idealized climate change skeptic is that his skepticism is not due to 
straightforwardly false factual beliefs about what the expert consensus about climate change is. 
According to survey data from the PEW Research Center as of 2016, 35% of Americans say that the 
percentage of climate scientists who say that human behavior is mostly responsible for climate change 
is “about half”, “fewer than half”, or “almost none”.10 Since these answers are straightforwardly 
factually inaccurate – surveys of climate scientists show that the vast majority say that human behavior 
is mostly responsible for climate change11 – skepticism that is founded on them is not especially 
philosophically interesting. Rather, the more philosophically interesting climate change skeptic is one 
who is aware of the expert consensus on climate change, but distrusts or is uncertain of the reliability 
of these experts. This too is common: the same PEW survey shows that only 32% of Americans think 
that the research findings of climate scientists are influenced by “the best available evidence” most of 
the time, and that respondents are about as likely to attribute scientists’ findings to “scientists’ own 
political leanings” (27%) or their “desire to advance their careers” (36%).12 
 This leads directly into the third feature of the idealized climate change skeptic: he has a 
skeptical scenario that, if it obtained, would explain away the apparent evidence for climate change 
(namely, the expert consensus). The skeptical scenario is likely to be something like this:  
 
Conspiracy. There is no anthropogenic climate change, but there is an elaborate scientific 
conspiracy to suggest that there is, motivated by factors like scientists’ political leanings and 
desire to advance their careers. Some scientists knowingly lie to sustain the conspiracy, while 
others are more unwitting participants, genuinely convincing themselves of the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change through wishful thinking, motivated reasoning, selective or 
biased processing of the evidence, or groupthink. Scientists are consciously and 
subconsciously disincentivized from uncovering the conspiracy or revealing the truth that it 
hides, since if they do so, they will be denied publications, grants and jobs. Those who do 
speak out against the conspiracy are marginalized, forced out of the profession, or hushed up.  
 
Conspiracy-type scenarios play the same sort of role for the idealized climate change skeptic that brain-
in-a-vat-type scenarios play for the external world skeptic. (Indeed, both scenarios involve nefarious 
scientists deceiving us!) To maintain the parallel between the cases, our idealized climate change 
skeptic won’t positively affirm that the conspiracy scenario obtains. Rather, he will hold only that we 
don’t have evidence that enables us to rule the conspiracy scenario out. The expert consensus on 
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climate change, he’ll concede, could be explained by the reality of anthropogenic climate change (much 
as the appearance as of sitting in a room could be explained by actually sitting in a room). But it also 
could be explained by a conspiracy (much as the appearance as of sitting in a room could be explained 
by being a brain-in-a-vat deceived to think you’re sitting in a room). The existence of the consensus, 
he claims, doesn’t tell between these two hypotheses (just as the appearance of sitting in a room 
doesn’t tell between the actually-sitting-in-a-room hypothesis and the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis). 
As with the external world skeptic, this position is made harder to argue against by the fact 
that the conspiracy scenario, suitably developed, conveniently explains away any potential piece of 
(apparent) evidence against itself. All the appearances of non-conspiracy – like the lack of scientific 
results uncovering the conspiracy – can themselves be hypothesized to be a part of, or explained by, 
the conspiracy. 
An objection may be raised here.13 The “conspiracy” scenario as I imagined it involves some 
elements that are not in themselves conspiratorial in a narrow sense, such as motivated reasoning, bias 
and groupthink.14 But to the extent that the climate change skeptic stresses these factors more than he 
stresses deliberate, conscious conspiracy, perhaps this opens up an important disanalogy between him 
and the external world skeptic. In particular, these charges of motivated reasoning, bias and groupthink 
seem open to empirical refutation in a way that both brain-in-a-vat and (narrowly) conspiracy-theoretic 
hypotheses are not. In my view, however, there is not as big a difference here as the objector makes 
out. From the point of view of a layperson it seems close to impossible – in practice if not in principle 
– to definitively determine whether the scientific consensus is due to a convergence on the truth or 
whether it is due to motivated reasoning or groupthink. The best way of determining this would be to 
directly evaluate whether the scientific data actually supports the consensus, but the layperson lacks 
the scientific competence to do this. Moreover, responses to the charge that a particular conclusion is 
due to bias, motivated reasoning and groupthink are hard to definitively rule out can themselves be 
charged with being a product of bias or groupthink. So I don’t think that whether the climate change 
skeptic stresses conscious conspiracy or these more subconscious elements makes a huge difference 
to the structure of the dialectic between the skeptic and the non-skeptic.15 
To make the parallel with external world skepticism crisper and clearer, we can imagine our 
idealized climate change skeptic advancing an adapted version of the argument from ignorance: 
 
(1) You don’t know that the conspiracy scenario doesn’t obtain. 
(2) If you don’t know that the conspiracy scenario doesn’t obtain, then you don’t know that 
anthropogenic climate change is occurring. 
Therefore, 
(C) You don’t know that anthropogenic climate change is occurring.  
 
As with the original argument for ignorance, the argument can be generalized from knowledge to 
justification. If the conspiracy scenario explains away any potential piece of (apparent) evidence against 
itself – such that you would have this (apparent) evidence even if the conspiracy scenario obtained – 
then it seems that none of this evidence really is evidence against the conspiracy scenario. But if you 
don’t have any evidence against the conspiracy scenario, you can’t be justified in believing that the 
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conspiracy scenario doesn’t obtain. And if that’s so, then (it seems), you can’t be justified in believing 
that anthropogenic climate change is occurring. 
Lest it seem fanciful to imagine a real-world climate change skeptic developing a conspiracy 
scenario of the sort that this argument employs, it is worth summarizing a real-world instance detailed 
by Oreskes & Conway (2010: 207-8). In 1996, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
published a working group report on climate change, which included a chapter on “Detection of 
Climate Change and Attribution of Causes”. The chapter, prepared by thirty-six of the world’s leading 
climate scientists before being reviewed by representatives of governments participated in the IPCC, 
was a landmark in making the claim that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible 
human influence on global climate.” In response, two prominent representatives of the oil industry 
accused two of the lead scientists behind the chapter of “secretly altering the IPCC report, suppressing 
dissent by other scientists, and eliminating references to scientific uncertainties.” And the physicist 
and climate change skeptic Fred Seitz proclaimed that he had “never witnessed a more disturbing 
corruption of the peer-review process than the events that led to the IPCC report” and that “nearly 
all [of the revisions] worked to remove hints of the skepticism with which many scientists regard 
claims that human activities are having a major impact on climate.”  
These are positive allegations of conspiracy and cover-up, rather than merely floatings of such 
a possibility. But we can imagine some non-expert who hears the IPCC report on one hand, and the 
accusations of conspiracy on the other, and does not know which to believe. For such an individual, 
the Conspiracy-type scenario is salient, and even if she does not affirmatively believe that the 
conspiracy obtains, she may find herself unsure how to rule it out. Her position may be made even 
harder by the fact that there are accusations of conspiracy on both sides of the debate.16 Seitz and others 
accused the IPCC authors of being engaged in a politically motivated conspiracy to distort the 
scientific consensus on climate change to make it seem more weighted in favor of anthropogenic 
hypotheses than it was. The IPCC authors and their allies responded by emphatically denying this, and 
by in turn alleging that it was in fact Seitz who was engaged in a politically (and financially) motivated 
conspiracy to distort the scientific consensus on climate change to make it seem more weighted against 
anthropogenic hypotheses than it was. Each side thus strongly denied being engaged in a conspiracy, 
and accused the other side of being engaged in one. To the non-expert, these allegations of conspiracy 
might seem on a par with one another, especially if she doesn’t antecedently trust one side more than 
the other. And this might leave her tempted by the adapted argument from ignorance. 
3. Summing up the idealized climate change skeptic’s challenge 
 
The idealized climate change skeptic, I think, poses two problems to the defender of beliefs based on 
mainstream climate science. The first is a practical problem: the idealized climate change skeptic is 
dialectically very hard to convince. The problem is that anything that we can try to marshal to support 
our beliefs in anthropogenic climate change is itself called into question by the skeptic’s conspiracy 
scenario. This is an instance of a more general problem emphasized by Michael Lynch (2012, 
forthcoming): it is very hard to mount a defense of our views about which sources to trust from first 
principles, without relying on (some of) the very sources under dispute. Thus, we often won’t be able 
to say anything persuasive in defense of these sources to someone who doubts them.17  
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 In addition to this practical problem, the idealized climate change skeptic also poses us a more 
philosophical challenge, very similar to that of the external world skeptic. The challenge is to explain 
on what grounds we can justifiably dismiss the conspiracy scenario – or to explain how, even though 
we can’t dismiss it, we’re still justified in continuing to believe in anthropogenic climate change, rather 
than suspending judgment. Though I am not a climate change skeptic, I am bothered by the question 
of how to respond to the climate change skeptic’s challenge (just as I am bothered by the question of 
how to respond to the external world skeptic’s challenge). Though I can’t settle this definitively here, 
the next and final section surveys some possible answers.  
4. Responding to the idealized climate change skeptic 
 
One strategy is to try to give some specific response to the idealized climate change skeptic that isn’t 
intended to generalize to address the external world skeptic. We might try to directly examine the 
scientific data to confirm that it does support belief in anthropogenic climate change, and thus that the 
scientific consensus is not merely a result of conspiracy. But a layperson, who lacks scientific 
competence, can’t responsibly or accurately evaluate the scientific data and its implications without 
deferring to experts – so I take it this option is unavailable for her.  
Somewhat more promisingly, we might say that our evidence against the conspiracy scenario 
is that scientific conspiracies are rare, and there haven’t been many in the past. However, if the 
idealized climate change skeptic is deft enough, she can explain away these facts as part of her skeptical 
hypotheses, alleging a broader conspiracy. Moreover, while deliberate scientific conspiracies may be 
rare, the literature on pessimistic (meta-)induction arguments in philosophy of science reminds us that 
scientific views that were once orthodox and enjoyed great consensus have very often turned out to 
be false.18  
So I think we should look at responses to the idealized climate change skeptic that draw on 
the parallel with the external world skeptic. One prominent anti-skeptical idea is that we enjoy a 
“default justification” or “unearned entitlement”, without evidence, to accept certain propositions that 
play a role as “cornerstones” or “foundational assumptions” in our thought.19 However, while the 
proposition that we’re not brains-in-vats – or, at least the proposition that the world is roughly as it 
appears to be – plausibly occupies this kind of role in our thought, the proposition that there is no 
elaborate scientific conspiracy to fake anthropogenic global warming does not seem to be such a 
cornerstone. It’s easy to imagine us going on with our cognitive lives without it, without a fundamental 
restructuring of our cognitive architecture or any change in our way of using appearances as a guide 
to reality. It’s thus hard to see what would give us an “unearned” entitlement to it without evidence.  
A different prominent anti-skeptical view is “dogmatism” of the sort defended by Pryor 
(2000). According to the dogmatist, perceptual experiences as of p (defeasibly) justify you in believing 
p, in a way that doesn’t not presuppose or rest on any antecedent justification for believing anything 
else. So, for example, a perceptual experience as of being seated in a room, reading a philosophy book 
defeasibly justifies you in believing that you are seated in a room, reading a philosophy book – 
regardless of whether you have any antecedent justification for believing that you are not a brain in a 
vat. In itself, this picture does not say anything about what, if anything, does ultimately justify you in 
believing that you are not a brain in a vat. But it’s commonly assumed that the dogmatist will go on 
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to say that your experience (e.g.) as of being seated in a room, reading a philosophy book justifies you 
not only in believing that you are seated in a room, reading a philosophy book, but also in believing 
that you are not a brain in a vat being deceived to think that you’re seated in a room reading a 
philosophy book. 
Again, however, it’s not clear how this dogmatist position generalizes to deal with the idealized 
climate change skeptic. The evidence that ordinary people have in favor of anthropogenic climate 
change – namely the testimony of scientists to that effect – is not perceptual in the standard sense. 
One might try to extend the dogmatist position to testimony. But an analogous principle for testimony 
would say that when someone tells you that p, this (defeasibly) justifies you in believing p, regardless 
of whether you have any antecedent justification for believing the testifier to be reliable, or for 
believing that he is not trying to deceive you. This does not seem all that plausible. 
But even if the dogmatist position cannot be worked out to give a reply to the climate change 
skeptic, there may be an insight to be mined from it. The core insight is this: just because two 
hypotheses are equally consistent with, or well-predicted by, your evidence, it need not be that they 
are both equally credible. Indeed, if this were so, it wouldn’t just be that you’d need to give equal 
credence to the hypothesis that things are roughly as they appear to be and the hypothesis that you’re 
a brain-in-a-vat being fed misleading appearances. There are a vast multitude, perhaps an infinitude, 
of other imaginable skeptical scenarios that are also equally well-predicted by the evidence (ones 
involving dreaming, or evil demons, etc). The principle under consideration would thus say that you’d 
need to divide your credence equally across all of these hypotheses, where the hypothesis that things 
are roughly as they seem to be is just one of them, such that your credence that things are roughly as 
they seem to be becomes extremely, perhaps infinitesimally, small. This seems a lot to stomach even 
for the external world skeptic. 
This still leaves us with the question of why we should positively think the hypothesis that 
things are roughly as they appear to be is more credible than the hypothesis that you’re a brain-in-a-
vat being fed misleading appearances. One view here is that, all other things equal, the simpler 
hypothesis is more credible.20 The hypothesis that things are roughly as they appear to be is simpler 
than the hypothesis that there’s an elaborate plot involving scientists and vats to make them seem as 
they appear to be. And the hypothesis that anthropogenic climate change is really occurring is simpler 
than the hypothesis that there’s an elaborate scientific plot to make it seem like it’s occurring. 
 Relatedly, one might wonder whether there is something non-credible about hypotheses that 
have been designed specifically to explain away all of the potential counterevidence against them. As 
we saw earlier, whenever there’s some putative piece of evidence that seems to indicate that you’re 
not a brain-in-a-vat, the external world skeptic just explains it away by building it into the story about 
the vatmasters’ deception. Similarly, whenever there’s some putative piece of evidence that seems to 
indicate that anthropogenic climate change is occurring, the climate change skeptic just explains it 
away by building it into the story about the climate scientists’ conspiracy. These moves made the 
skeptic frustratingly hard to refute, but they also may be vulnerable to a charge of ad hockery. The 
skeptic’s whole strategy is to make their own hypothesis impossible to falsify by building whatever 
complications into her hypothesis she needs to in order to refute the counterevidence, on an ad hoc 
basis as and when that counterevidence needs refuting. Perhaps the fact that a hypothesis has been 
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developed in this fashion diminishes its credibility. Or perhaps a hypothesis is more credible when we 
know what evidence would count against it, and we haven’t received that evidence.21 That is so with 
the hypothesis that you’re currently sitting in a room reading a philosophy book, but not with the 
hypothesis that you’re a brain-in-a-vat. And it is so with the hypothesis that anthropogenic climate 
change is occurring, but not with the hypothesis that there’s an elaborate scientific plot to make it 
seem like it’s occurring.  
 The comparison between the two kinds of skepticism also creates a problem for the climate 
change skeptic that is independent of any particular response to it. The problem is this: the climate 
change skeptic, presumably, does not want to be an external world skeptic. She wants to bring down 
our beliefs about anthropogenic climate change, not our beliefs about everything! But if the climate 
change skeptic’s argument trades on the same skeptical strategy that the external world skeptic 
employs – if, for example, it relies on the principle that two hypotheses that predict the evidence 
equally well must be equally credible – then it is very hard to see how the climate change skeptic avoids 
a slide into a more general skepticism. Thus, the challenge for the climate change skeptic is to explain 
how her reasoning doesn’t generalize. Without a response to this challenge, her local climate change 
skepticism looks unprincipled, and likely, politically motivated. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Thus, if the most philosophically respectable version of climate change skepticism relies on reasoning 
that leads us into such wholesale external world skepticism, the climate change skeptic is in trouble. 
But equally, this parallel may also cast the external world skeptic in a negative light. The skeptical 
hypothesis that she employs seems to have the same ad hoc, deliberately unfalsifiable nature as the 
conspiracy hypothesis that the climate change skeptic employs, and her style of argument works in the 
same way as the idealized climate change skeptic’s. Perhaps, then, the external world skeptic herself is 
just another conspiracy theorist. 
 If the external world skeptic’s challenge and the (idealized) climate change skeptic’s challenge 
are effectively instances of the same central problem – namely, how we are to justifiably dismiss 
seemingly far-fetched hypotheses that are designed to explain away all of our apparent evidence against 
them – then a good response to the external world skeptic will be able to generalize to the climate 
change skeptic. But as we have seen, some of the most prominent responses to the external world 
skeptic seem not to happily generalize in this way. This is a mark against these responses. 
 To some, the debate about skepticism is philosophy at its silliest: the project of asking 
ourselves whether the really know that there are chairs and trees and hands and so on is supposed to 
be an amusing example of philosophy’s excesses and deviation from common sense. But the way in 
which the external world skeptic’s reasoning shows up so analogously in the real-life case of the climate 
change skeptic illustrates why the debate about skepticism matters. It matters because it raises deep 
and fundamental questions about what evidential support is, and about how to choose between 
competing hypotheses that purport to explain the evidence. These questions are imminent in real-
world deliberation about what to believe. When we are facing the climate change skeptic down, we 
need some account of why it is OK to dismiss her skeptical conspiracy hypothesis. And without such 
10 
 
an account, we cannot legitimately expect her to change her mind. Thus, developing such an account 
is a task of immense importance.  
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